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Policy Analysis: The NDRC’s Reg. No. 11, China’s 
New Capital Control 
 
Yumeng Xu*  
INTRODUCTION 
Trade disputes between the United States and China have caught 
momentary worldwide attention. However, because the world’s two largest 
economies are interlocked in various aspects, it is hard to cut these 
connections, despite Washington and Beijing’s constant effort to dwindle 
each other’s impact. As one of the major sources of foreign investment for 
the U.S.,1 China has been adjusting its capital control policies for years in 
response to development needs and in order to address the changing 
investment environment in foreign countries.2 This Note spotlights China’s 
latest outbound capital control regulation, NDRC Regulation No. 11 (“Reg. 
No. 11”), and how it suits China’s strategic plan of “made in China 2025.” 
Briefly, this Note will also analyze this regulation’s potential impact on U.S. 
policy on China’s investment funds. 
Capital control is an essential way for a country to fix its currency’s 
exchange rate while maintaining its sovereignty over monetary policy. In 
his 1997 paper, the incumbent Chief Economist of the International 
Monetary Fund, Maurice Obstfeld, developed a “trilemma” model, which 
is now known as the “Mundell-Fleming trilemma.”3 This model describes 
the relationship between the free flow of capital, a fixed exchange rate, 
and an independent monetary policy. As the name “trilemma” indicates, 
these three policy goals cannot all be realized at the same time. According 
to the trilemma, if a country wants to have an independent the monetary 
policy, it must exercise capital control in order to achieve fixed exchange 
rates of its currency because only stable capital inflows and outflows can 
 
         *  Yumeng Xu, J.D. Candidate at the University of California Hastings, Class of 2020. 
 1. China, SELECTUSA, 2018, https://www.selectusa.gov./servlet/servlet.FileDownl oad?file=015 
t0000000LKM1. 
 2. Tian Chen & Yinan Zhao, China’s Capital Controls Keep a Bad Year from Getting Worse, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2018, 8:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/china-s-
capital-controls-keep-a-very-bad-year-from-getting-worse. 
 3. Maurice Obstfeld et al., The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary 
Policies, and Capital Mobility (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.10396, Mar. 2004). 
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yield a fixed exchange rate.4 
Currently, capital control practices are no longer the mainstream 
monetary policy. For example, the Bretton Woods Agreement was a global 
exercise of capital control.5 The rules of Bretton Woods provided for a 
system of fixed exchange rates—every member country would “peg” their 
currencies to the U.S. dollar.6 Stringent capital control practices among the 
member countries allowed them to maintain an independent monetary policy 
(i.e., discretionary domestic interest rates).7 The trend of globalization, 
particularly growing international economic activities, led to great conflicts 
between capital controls and pegged exchange rates, which finally brought 
an end to Bretton Woods.8 Today, most countries allow their currencies’ 
exchange rates to float.9 
Yet, there are still several countries that stick to capital control 
practices. Harvard economist, Dani Rodrik, argued that the Bretton Woods 
system, essentially the capital control policy, was the best practice for 
economic growth.10 He credited the world’s stable GDP boom during the 
Bretton Woods era to capital control practices, while attributing frequent 
economic crises in recent decades to free capital flows (i.e., the financial 
globalization). Among the world’s most important economies, China and 
India still exercise capital control.11 
China has been a steady follower of the capital control policy ever since 
its economic reform in 1979.12 The same year it started to globalize, China 
set up the State General Administration of Foreign Exchange (“SGAFE,” 
now the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, or “SAFE”) to supervise 
capital flows.13 Almost 40 years have passed since the initial set-up. Since 
then, China has developed a more complex system of capital control. 
However, to date, there is not a single regulator in charge of all capital 
control policies in China nor a unified, formal regulatory document that 
 
 4. See id. at 1. 
 5. BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS 9 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Steil, supra note 5, at 3. 
 8. Atish R. Ghosh & Mahvash S. Qureshi, What’s In a Name? That Which We Call Capital Controls 
22 (IMF WORKING PAPER WP/16/25, Feb. 2016). 
 9. See id. at 6. 
 10. See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 10 (2012). 
 11. Michael W. Klein, Conference Daft, Capital Controls: Gates and Walls, BROOKINGS INST., Sept. 
4, 2012, at 4. 
 12. SAFE, The History of State Administration of Foreign Exchange (in Chinese language) (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2019), http://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/lsyg/index.html. 
 13. Guijun Lin, China’s Foreign Exchange Policies Since 1979: A Review of Developments and 
Assessment, CITESEERX 6 (Jan. 2003), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1 
94.8075&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
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guards against cross-border capital flow risks.14 
Among all areas of capital control, the control over China’s outbound 
investments has become a particular concern of destabilization to the capital 
control scheme. According to the Mundell-Fleming trilemma, if China wants 
to maintain a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy, it 
must control both capital inflows and outflows. Buying and selling foreign 
exchange reserves to combat foreign investment inflows and outflows is an 
essential practice for China’s government. Particularly, this practice is an 
attempt to fix currency exchange rates in order to maintain an unchanged 
domestic money supply.15 A substantial drop in China’s foreign exchange 
reserve would greatly reduce the government’s capability to adjust its 
economy. Since 2014, China’s foreign reserves have been declining.16 Some 
blame Chinese enterprises’ active overseas merger and acquisition  activities 
(“M&As”) for China’s rapid, short-term, foreign exchange reserve drop 
during 2016.17 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) has been steadily 
growing since 2010.18 In 2016, China invested over $46.49 billion into U.S., 
while the U.S. only invested $13.81 billion into China.19 
Since November 2016, in response to the skyrocketing overseas 
investments, regulators in China have been tightening their regulatory 
measures to restrict outward remittances of foreign currency. Specifically, 
in December 2017, the National Development & Reform Commission 
(“NDRC”) issued Reg. No. 11, which came into effect on March 1st, 2018, 
and implemented new measures for enterprise investments.20 Supposedly, 
Reg. No. 11 is meant to be a stringent capital control policy. However, 
when compared to its predecessor, NDRC Reg. No. 9 (“Reg. No. 9”), Reg. 
No. 11 relaxes capital controls over certain types of outbound investment, 
while performing its designated duty to constrain.21 For example, under the 
current regime, Foreign Portfolio Investments are under scrutiny while 
investments in offshore research and development centers only need to go 
 
 14. Baker McKenzie, New Restrictions on China Outbound Investments (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/01/new-restrictions-china-outbound-inve 
stments. 
 15. Christopher J. Neely, Chinese Foreign Exchange Reserves, Policy Choices and the U.S. 
Economy, FED. RSV. BANK OF ST. LOUISWORKING PAPER 2017-001A (Jan. 2017). 
 16. SAFE, The Scale of China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves (1950-2017 ) (last visited Oct. 25, 
2019), https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2018/0408/1426.html. 
 17. SAFE, supra note 12. 
 18. Rhodium Group, The U.S.-China Project (last visited Oct. 25, 2019), https://rhodiumgro 
up.gistapp.com/us_china_foreign_direct_investments. 
 19. SAFE, supra note 12. 
 20.  Nat’l Dev. And Reform Comm’n, Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment of 
Enterprises (Dec. 2017), http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=307304 (effective since March 
2018). 
 21. See id. 
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through minimal procedures. 
“Made in China 2025” is the key to understanding the inconsistent 
design of Reg. No. 11. “Made in China 2025” is a blueprint for transforming 
the country from a labor-intensive economy that makes toys and clothes, into 
one that engineers advanced products, like robots and electric cars.22 It calls 
for 70% of related materials and parts to be made domestically within a 
decade.23 The plan funnels billions of dollars into ten industries, ranging 
from biopharmaceuticals to aerospace to telecom devices.24 It is not a 
coincidence that these industries are also facilitated by Reg. No. 11. 
Having features that both tighten and loosen, Reg. No. 11 is not only a 
capital control policy. By streamlining the process for outbound investments 
in cutting-edge technologies, Reg. No. 11 also sets a clear goal for supporting 
the strategic “Made in China 2025” plan. Whether China’s outbound 
investment regulation reform will be effective remains to be seen, as the new 
policy has only been implemented for less than a year. Furthermore, 
considering externalities is essential in evaluating the effectiveness of Reg. 
No. 11. “Made in China 2025” is now a focus of the U.S.-China trade 
dispute. Directly addressing Reg. No. 11, the U.S. issued the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (“FIRRMA”) to disincentivize 
the types of investments encouraged by Reg. No. 11.25 
The newly amended Reg. No. 11 of the National Development & 
Reform Commission creates a tightened control over China’s capital 
outflows regarding outbound investments. This new policy also loosens 
control over certain types of investments, such as investments in advanced 
technology and manufacturing, to facilitate China’s strategic plan of “Made 
in China 2025.” However, this investment favoritism is unlikely to reform 
the pattern of China’s outbound investment due to its ineffective 
enforcement power of ex-post supervision and international externalities, 
such as FIRRMA of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (“CFIUS”).26 
The focus of this Note is the study of Reg. No. 11. This Note first argues 
that this newly tightened capital control policy loosens control over certain 
types of investments. Second, this Note discusses the rationale behind the 
design of Reg. No. 11—to serve the strategic “Made in China 2025” plan. 
 
 22. Jessica Meyers, How ‘Made in China 2025’ Became the Real Threat in a Trade War, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-2025-20180424-story.html. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Meyers, supra note 22. 
 25. Thilo Hanemann, Cassie Gao & Adam Lysenko, Net Negative: Chinese Investment in the US in 
2018, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 13, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/chinese-investment-in-the-us-2018-
recap/. 
 26. See id. 
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Third, this Note examines the effectiveness of the new measurement in 
dealing with existing loopholes and obstacles set by countries of destination, 
such as the FIRRMA of CFIUS. 
BREAKING DOWN REG. NO. 11 
 
In 2004, the NDRC issued interim outbound investment measures in an 
attempt to regulate Chinese enterprises’ FDI projects, primarily to facilitate 
outbound investments in resource development.27 In 2008, the NDRC made 
a few adjustments to the 2004 measure, primarily by raising the threshold of 
the amount of required investment to file for approval and extended 
discretion of local NDRCs.28 In 2014, the NDRC issued Reg. No. 9 to replace 
the 2004 regime.29 Reg. No. 9 abandoned the taxonomy of “resource 
development” versus “other projects,” and adopted the classifications 
“sensitive investment” and “non-sensitive investment[s].” Reg. No. 9 further 
raised the threshold and ceiling amounts for different filing procedures. Reg. 
No. 11, which is the current regulation for China’s outbound investments, 
further reformed both the procedures and the scope of the regulation. 
THE NDRC AND THE OUTBOUND INVESTMENT FILING SYSTEM 
 
The NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under the Chinese 
State Council.30 It has broad administrative and planning control over the 
Chinese economy.31 The NDRC’s main functions include to: study and 
formulate policies for economic and social development, maintain the 
balance of the economic development, and guide the restructuring of China’s 
financial system.32 Each year, the NDRC submits a plan for national 
economic and social development to the National People’s Congress on 
behalf of the State Council.33 
Besides the NDRC’s guidelines, an investor has to work with other 
 
 27. NDRC, Interim Measures for the Administration of Examination and Approval of Overseas 
Investment Projects (Oct. 2004), http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=55603. 
 28. NDRC, Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission regarding Decentralizing 
the Approval Authority of Foreign Investment Projects (July 2008), http://en.pkulaw.cn/displa 
y.aspx?id=48189f87d68a74aabdfb&lib=law. 
 29. NDRC, Measures for the Administration of Confirmation and Recordation of Overseas 
Investment Projects (Apr. 2014), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=223005&lib=law. 
 30. See NDRC, Main Functions of the NDRC (last visited Oct. 25, 2019), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn 
/mfndrc/. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See NDRC, supra note 30. 
 33. See NDRC, Measures for the Administration of Confirmation and Recordation of Overseas 
Investment Projects (Apr. 2014), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=223005&lib=law. 
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government agencies before it can finalize an outbound investment.34 The 
Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) is another crucial agency in 
regulating Chinese outbound investments.35 In its business nature, the 
MOFCOM pays more attention to China’s economic and trade relations 
with other economies (chiefly the U.S., the E.U., and the BRICS).36 The 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(“SASAC”) is responsible for managing the State-Owned Enterprises 
(“SOEs”), including appointing top executives, approving M&As, and 
agreeing to sales of stocks or assets.37 The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (“CSRC”) reserves discretion in examining outbound 
investment proposals of Chinese listed companies.38 If an investment 
involves leverage, the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) is a competent 
regulator.39 The last step requires filing the project with SAFE for the 
transmission of foreign currency funds out of China.40 
In general, the prerequisite for all the subsequent regulatory compliance 
procedures for Chinese outbound investors is the NRDC’s consent.41 After 
the consent of MOFCOM, depending on the investor’s characteristics, it may 
have to file with the SASAC or the CSRC.42 The final step requires applying 
to SAFE for foreign exchange registration.43 Because the NDRC is both the 
 
 34. For the purposes of this paper, the term “investor” only refers to legal persons (i.e., enterprises) 
that make outbound investments. Individual investors, being natural person per se, are not regulated by 
the NDRC outbound investment regimes, thus, are not the topic of this paper. 
 35. MOFCOM, Main Mandate of the Ministry of Commerce (Feb. 2009), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20090207180223/http://english.mofcom.gov.cn:80/mission.shtml. 
 36. The acronym “BRICS” stands for: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Jida Zhang & 
Feng Yang, Comparison of Outbound Investment Regulators, VANTAGE ASIA (in Chinese language) 
(June 2015), https://www.vantageasia.com/zh-hans/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%B D%E4%BC%81% 
E4%B8%9A%E5%A2%83%E5%A4%96%E6%8A%95%E8%B5%84%E7%9B%91%E7%AE%A1%
E9%83%A8%E9%97%A8%E6%96%B0%E8%A7%84%E6%AF%94%E8%BE%83/. 
 37. State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administrative Council, What We do (last visited Oct. 25, 
2019), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2018/07/17/c_7.htm. 
38. China Securities Regulatory Commission, Decision of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on Amending the Provisions on the Material Asset Reorganization and Ancillary Financing 
of Listed Companies (Aug. 2011), http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=156089. 
39. People’s Bank of China, Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Further Clarifying Matters 
concerning the RMB Loans Granted Overseas by Domestic Enterprises (Nov. 2016), http://en.pkulaw.cn/ 
display.aspx?cgid=287011&lib=law. 
 40. State Administration of Foreign Exchange, The Provisions on the Foreign Exchange 
Administration of the Overseas Direct Investment of Domestic Institutions (July 2009), http://en.pkul 
aw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=119255&lib=law&EncodingName=big5. 
 41. Ernst & Young China, Joint Notice of Seven National Regulators on Outbound Investment 
Regulation (In Chinese Language) (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-belt-
and-road-other-insights-9-feb-2018/$FILE/ey-belt-and-road-other-insights-9-feb-2018.pdf. 
 42. Deloitte China, Scrutinizing the regulations of China’s outbound investments (in Chinese 
language) (last visited Oct. 25, 2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/dl/Documents/l 
egal/ChineseOutbound_Mandarin.pdf, at 2-3. 
 43. See id. 
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planner and administrator of China’s macroeconomy, a study on the NDRC’s 
policies can directly interpret the authorities’ positioning of China’s 
outbound investments. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF NDRC’S OUTBOUND INVESTMENT POLICIES 
 
2004 Interim Measures and the 2008 amendment 
 
The earliest NDRC regulation distinguished outbound investments in 
resource development, such as drilling oil wells, from all other investments.44 
For example, an investor had to obtain approval from the NDRC if the 
investment was over $10 million.45 However, if the investment was in 
outbound resource development, the investor did not need Beijing’s 
approval, unless the investment amount was greater than $30 million.46 
Therefore, as compared to the same amount for investments in other areas, 
transaction costs for investments in foreign resources development would be 
far lower. 
The 2004 measures also facilitated outbound investments made by 
SOEs. For example, if an SOE’s resource development investment was more 
than $30 million, the enterprise only had to file a recordation with the 
NDRC.47 If the investors were not SOEs, then approval from either the 
NDRC or the State Council was required for resources investments greater 
than $30 million.48 With the recordation requirement instead of the approval 
requirement, the cost of compliance for SOEs to make outbound investments 
were much lower than for non-SOEs. 
The primary purpose of facilitating resource development investments 
and SOE investments remained unchanged in the 2008 amendment. The 
notice primarily amended the threshold and ceiling amounts for different 
categories of investments, and the mechanism would  raise the amounts for 
each ten-fold.49 Another feature of the 2008 note was to centralize power of 
the NDRC. For example, the 2008 note delegates the State Council’s 
authority to the NDRC.50 
 
 
 
 44. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 4. 
 45. All the investment amounts for the NDRC’s outbound investment regulations are in U.S. Dollar 
amounts. 
 46. NDRC, supra note 20, § 6. 
 47. Id. at § 8. 
 48. Id. at § 9. 
 49. Id. at § 3. 
 50. Id. 
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Reg. No. 9 of 2014 
 
The 2014 reform completely replaced the 2004 regime. There was no 
longer a fast pass for resource development projects. Instead, Reg. No. 9 
focused primarily on limiting “sensitive” investments. Reg. No. 9 defined 
both sensitive countries/regions and sensitive industries.51 The sensitive 
countries/regions included countries without established diplomatic 
relations, sanctioned countries, and investment projects in countries/regions 
where war or upheaval occured.52 Sensitive industries included baseline 
telecommunication operations, utilization of trans-border water resources, 
large-scale land development, electric mains, power grids, and news media53 
For either investments in sensitive countries/regions or industries, investors 
had to obtain approval from the State Council or the NDRC.54 
By simplifying the approval procedure for the recordation process, Reg. 
No. 9 better facilitated all insensitive outbound investments. The recordation 
system was no longer only a fast-track for SOE investments. Most of the 
investments, so long as they were not too sensitive and large-scale, were not 
required for approval, but only recordation.55 An investment only needed 
approval from the NDRC if it exceeded $1 billion.56 By contrast, the great 
compliance burden on all sensitive investments, imposed by the Reg. No. 9, 
discouraged investments to the defined countries/regions and industries. The 
preferential treatment to different types of investments remained an effective 
tool of the NDRC to shape China’s outbound investments, as this Note will 
later discuss. 
Another notable innovation for Reg. No. 9 was that it added more 
transparency by providing a detailed submission procedure and specifying 
the requirements for completing the Project Application Report.57 Moreover, 
Reg. No. 9 provided timelines measures for certain approval steps.58 In 
contrast, the 2004 regime did not specify mandatory times for responses. 
Such a policy vacuum left the NDRC with great discretion and added 
uncertainty for investors. The defined timelines in Reg. No. 9 substantially 
reduced the transaction costs for all types of investments. Yet, the 
comparative advantage for SOE still existed in the Reg. No. 9. Unlike the 
substantial investments made by non-SOEs, which required approval from 
 
 51. NDRC, supra note 33, § 7. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at § 14. 
 55. See id. at 11. 
 56. See id. at § 7. 
 57. See id. at § 10. 
 58. See id. at § 13-16. 
4 - XU_KC_10.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  11:13 AM 
Winter 2020] REG. NO. 11 103 
the NDRC or the State Council, SOEs’ outbound investments only required 
recordation with the NDRC, even if the investment exceeded $1 billion.59 
 
Summary 
 
In general, from the 2004 regime to the 2008 amendments to the 2014 
comprehensive reform, the NDRC’s regulations added high dimension and 
granularity regarding outbound investments. By exempting resource 
development projects and SOE investments, the 2004 regime reflected the 
NDRC’s intent to incentivize domestic capital, especially state capital, and 
to engage in overseas raw material explorations. The 2014 Reg. No. 9 
completely reformed the 2004 regime’s philosophy by implementing an 
entirely new taxology of “sensitive investment[s].” While easing the 
compliance burden with more transparency to the procedure, the NDRC’s 
focus shifted from a rough goal—of encouraging overseas resource 
development—to a more elaborate strategy of promoting national interests 
through preferential treatment embedded in Reg. No. 9. 
 
ANATOMY OF REG. NO. 11 
 
The “tight” feature of Reg. No. 11 
 
Unlike Reg. No. 9 completely overturning previous regulations, Reg. 
No. 11 is a refined successor of Reg. No. 9. The 2018 regime adopted Reg. 
No. 9’s sensitive/non-sensitive terminology. However, Reg. No. 11 further 
tightens capital control by expanding the scope of regulated investments and 
broadening the spectrum of exemptions. Reg. No. 11 includes Chinese 
holding companies’ overseas operation companies in its supervision scope. 
In contrast, Reg. No. 9 only covered investors deemed Chinese domestic 
legal persons who directly provided financing or security interests to 
overseas investment projects.60 Domestic investors who conducted outbound 
investments through their offshore entities were not governed by Reg. No. 9, 
unless the investors directly provided financing or guarantees to their 
investment projects.61 Therefore, the abuse of “offshore entities” became a 
way for investors under Reg. No. 9 to arbitrage the regulation.62 In practice, 
 
 59. See id. at § 11. 
 60. See id. at § 2. 
 61. See id. at § 12. 
 62. Kaiding Wang, Interpreting NDRC Reg. No. 11, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (in Chinese 
language) (last visited Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/12/articles/corporate-
ma/%E7%83%AD%E7%82%B9%E8%A7%A3%E8%AF%BB%EF%BC%9A%E5%9B%BD%E5%A
E%B6%E5%8F%91%E6%94%B9%E5%A7%94%E6%AD%A3%E5%BC%8F%E5%8F%91%E5%B
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many investors set up offshore entities and avoided approval and recordation 
procedures by sending the remittance to their overseas subsidiaries in the 
name of internal financial operations instead of outbound investments.63 
Once the subsidiaries received the remittance, domestic investors could 
engage in any investment activities and be free from the NDRC, MOFCOM, 
and SAFE’s regulation.64 In contrast, under Reg. No. 11, offshore entities are 
subject to regulation if Chinese enterprises, directly or indirectly, hold at 
least 50% voting rights, or if Chinese enterprises obtain authority to manage 
the entities’ operational, financial, personnel, technological, or other 
important affairs.65 This part of the law is designed adequately because it 
carries out the NDRC’s purpose of restricting substantial foreign currency 
withdrawals without unnecessarily burdening ordinary business operations. 
Under this precise definition, overseas subsidiaries’ business decisions will 
not be affected by Reg. No. 9 if the Chinese holding companies do not de 
facto exercise their dominion over subsidiaries. 
“Sensitivity” becomes the quintessential term of art under Reg. No. 11, 
as it reserves approval power only for sensitive investments. Previously 
under Reg. No. 9, sensitive countries/regions included countries without 
established diplomatic relations, sanctioned countries, and investment 
projects in countries/regions where war or upheaval occurs.66 Sensitive 
industries included baseline telecommunication operations, utilization of 
trans-border water resources, large-scale land development, electric mains, 
power grids, and news media.67 Leaving the definition of “sensitive 
countries/regions” untouched, Reg. No. 11 deletes certain types of 
investments off the “sensitive industries” list. The definition of “sensitive 
industries” is an independent document incorporated into Reg. No. 11 by 
reference.68 Under the 2018 version of the list, “basic telecommunication 
operation,” “large-scale land development,” “electric mains,” and “power 
grids” are removed from the list of sensitive industries.69 Instead, Reg. No. 
11 adds a new category, “research on, manufacture and repair of weaponry,” 
and a catchall provision, “industries to be restricted from outbound 
investments according to laws, regulations[,] and relevant macro-control 
 
8%83%E7%AC%AC11%E5%8F%B7%E4%BB%A4%E3%80%8A%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A%E5
%A2%83%E5%A4%96/. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Wang, supra note 62. 
 65. NDRC, supra note 20, § 2. 
 66. NDRC, supra note 33, § 2. 
 67. See id. 
 68. NDRC, List of Sensitive Industries for Overseas Investments (in Chinese language) (2018), 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201802/W020180211608651590809.pdf. 
 69. Id. 
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policies.”70 The catchall provision is another independent document 
incorporated by reference—i.e., guidelines on overseas investment—that is 
issued by the General Office of the State Council.71 The current effective 
guideline, introduced in August 2017, includes real estate, hotels, 
entertainment, sports, and equity investment funds or platforms. Reg. No. 11 
leaves great discretion and flexibility for the NDRC to incorporate different 
independent documents and publish an updated list. Such a design allows the 
NDRC and the State Council to conveniently implement macroeconomic 
planning and government policy goals. This innovative definition of 
“sensitivity” is a hybrid of tightening and loosening features. In all, this 
improvement is a net tightening policy. 
The inclusion of Foreign Portfolio Investments (“FPIs”) is another 
significant step forward. FDI and FPI are two of the most common routes for 
investors investing in overseas economies.72 FDI implies direct investment 
by foreign investors into the productive assets of another nation; FPI means 
investing in financial assets.73 While the previous regimes comprehensively 
addressed regulations on FDI, regulations on FPI activities were never 
acknowledged. While the financial market debated over the applicability of 
the 2004 Interim Measures and the 2014 Reg. No. 9, Chinese financial 
enterprises’ overseas FPI activities remained a grey area. Nonetheless, 
China’s foreign currency withdrawals primarily comprise of FPIs.74 Under 
Reg. No. 11, the NDRC explicitly includes Chinese financial institutions’ 
outbound portfolio investments.75 Furthermore, one FPI activity, equity 
investment funds or platforms, is now listed among the enumerated sensitive 
industries.76 Consequently, this particular category of FPI will be under the 
highest scrutiny from filing with the NDRC to SAFE. 
Another centralization aspect of Reg. No. 11 is its enhanced sanction 
and enforcement capabilities. Previously, Reg. No. 9 set up administrative 
penalties.77 However, such deterrence punishment only applied in cases of 
failing to obtain a Project Information Report elaboration (i.e., “road-pass”), 
 
 70. NDRC, supra note 20, §13. 
 71. See General Office of the State Council, Notice of the General Office of the State Council on 
Forwarding the Guiding Opinions of the NDRC, the MOFCOM, the PBOC and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on Further Directing and Regulating the Direction of Overseas Investments (Aug. 2017), 
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=26336&lib=law. 
 72. See Elvis Picardo, FDI and FPI: Making sense of it all, INVESTOPEDIA (last visited Oct. 25, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/012914/foreign-investment-routes-fdi-and-fpi.asp. 
 73. See id. 
 74. According to SAFE’s quarterly report, China’s FPI for the 3d quarter of 2017 was peaked at 
$61.55 billion. See CIEC Data, China Foreign Portfolio Investment (last visited Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/foreign-portfolio-investment. 
 75. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 2. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at §§ 50-57. 
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where the administrative penalty was to reject the later filing for 
recordation/approval. Under Reg. No. 11, investor misconduct, such as 
trying to conceal or misrepresent transactions, is subject to administrative 
penalties (i.e., refusal of approval/recordation) or criminal proceedings.78 
Specifically, Reg. No. 11 provides mechanisms for reporting adverse 
material conditions, project completion and inquiry, and reports about 
material matters.79 Moreover, sanctions are shared with other authorities 
through online published documents.80 
Reg. No. 11 expanded the scope of the NDRC’s regulatory power by 
adding a new type of investor entity (i.e., overseas subsidiaries of Chinese 
holding companies), a new category of investment (i.e., FPIs), and a new 
way of defining an essential term of art to the objects of regulation. Besides, 
Reg. No. 11 also extends the NDRC’s power to exercise penalties and 
enforcement. As discussed above, Reg. No. 11 was anticipated as an updated 
measurement to tighten capital control in response to skyrocketing outbound 
investments. However, apart from the newly introduced constraining 
provisions, Reg. No. 11 effectively loosened its control due to exemptions 
from approval requirement, implicit preferences, and a new system for notice 
filing. 
 
The “loose” feature of Reg. No. 11 
 
Reg. No. 11 abandoned the amount-sensitive management under Reg. 
No. 9, exempting a large amount of outbound investments from approval 
requirements. Reg. No. 9 had great granularity for the size of foreign 
investments involved: any investment larger than $2 billion was subject to 
the State Council’s scrutiny; any investment less than $2 billion, but 
exceeding $300 million, was contingent on NDRC approval.81 Under Reg. 
No. 11, however, only sensitive investments need approval.82 For large 
amounts of investments, so long as they are not deemed sensitive by the 
NDRC’s definition, the maximum compliance cost will be filing for 
recordation with the NDRC, even if the investment exceeds $2 billion.83 For 
FDIs less than $300 billion, only recordation is required at the local 
Development and Reform Committee level.84 
Moreover, the General Office’s guidelines on overseas investments 
 
 78. See id. at §§ 52-53. 
 79. See id. at §§ 50-57. 
 80. See id. at § 58. 
 81. See id. at § 14. 
 82. See id. at § 13. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 13. 
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provides a “VIP” list of procedural reviews that must be conducted in the 
light most favorable to listed industries.85 The current version of the 
guidelines for the ‘encouraged category’ includes investments in: 
 
 Construction and facility connection along the route of “the 
Belt and Road;” 
 Overseas projects that facilitate the exportation of industrial 
capacities, equipment, and technical standards; 
 Increasing investment in, and cooperation with, overseas high-
tech enterprises, advancing manufacturing enterprises, an 
establishing offshore research and development centers; 
 Participating in the exploration and extraction of offshore oil, 
gas, mining, and other energy resources based on a prudent 
assessment of cost benefits; 
 Expanding investment and cooperation in agricultural projects; 
 Promoting investment in commerce, trading, cultural sector 
logistics, and other service sectors in an orderly manner, as well 
as supporting qualified financial institutions to set up offshore 
branches and service networks.86 
 
Even though the NDRC has been improving approval/recordation 
process transparency by capping the deadline of each of its transactional 
operations (e.g., 30 days for approval, seven days for recordation), in 
practice, there remains great elasticity. According to a few experienced 
practitioners, the NDRC’s approval procedure can take approximately 106 
days.87 Because the previous 2004 and 2014 regimes never referred to any 
indicators regarding when the NDRC will exercise its discretion to approve 
an investment project, the opacity created great compliance burdens and 
uncertainty.88 For the first time, authorities are enumerating industries that 
will be promoted by favorable discretion. By incorporating the General 
Counsel’s guideline into Reg. No. 11, the NDRC endorses preferential 
treatment. Though implicitly, the NDRC carves out a fast-pass for overseas 
projects that qualify under the description above. Consequently, these 
industries will enjoy loosened regulatory supervision. 
Reg. No. 11 juxtaposes a system with fewer procedural requirements, 
the notice system, with an existing approval and recordation practice. Under 
 
 85. General Office of the State Council, supra note 71, § 3. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Doug Ferguson & Sunny Song, Understanding the New Chinese Outbound Investment 
Regulations, KPMG AUSTRALIA (last visited  Oct. 25, 2019), https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/i 
nsights/2018/02/chinese-outbound-investment-regulations-16-february-2018.html. 
 88. See id. 
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Reg. No. 9, the recordation system served as an exemption measure to 
facilitate smaller investments and SOE investments. Compared to the 20-106 
day procedure to obtain an approval,89 a filing procedure that only takes 
seven business days significantly reduced the compliance cost.90 Reg. No. 11 
further eases this compliance burden by including a notice practice, which 
only takes five business days.91 Starting on March 1st, 2018—Reg. No. 11’s 
effective date—FPI amounts of $300 billion or more began enjoying this 
unique measurement.92 
Apart from its decentralization practice on non-sensitive outbound 
investments, the NDRC also eases compliance burdens by further 
streamlining filing processes and by adding more transparency to the 
procedure. Road-pass in Reg. No. 9 was a significant step forward for the 
NDRC to further extend its power to regulating outbound investments. It 
required Chinese enterprises, that were contemplating overseas acquisitions 
or bidding a substantial amount for investments, to submit their intended 
project before the initiation of any substantive work.93 The NDRC’s design 
of the road-pass was meant to prevent cutthroat competition between 
Chinese enterprises in overseas acquisitions or bidding. As a prerequisite for 
subsequent confirmation, the road-pass procedure enabled the government 
great discretion to veto an intended overseas acquisition at a very early stage. 
However, the compliance burden and uncertainties imposed by the road-pass 
requirements also made Chinese investors less competitive as compared with 
investors from other countries.94 
Reg. No. 11 reduces compliance burdens by eliminating the road-pass 
requirement. As discussed above, since the 2004 regime, the exercise of 
road-pass requirements was quite controversial. The NDRC set this road-
pass requirement early in the procedure, i.e., before Chinese enterprises start 
any substantive work, such as submitting an offer or accepting an offer by 
signing a binding contract.95 This policy design was redundant because it was 
meant to regulate Chinese enterprises’ overseas acquisition patterns. 
Uncertainty about a successful petition for the NDRC’s pre-confirmation 
letter added significant burdens and uncertainty at the early stages of an 
intended overseas acquisition. This disadvantage was exacerbated when 
multiple Chinese bidders intended a common project. Meanwhile, the policy 
goal anticipated by this road-pass regime can be achieved without 
 
 89. See NDRC, supra note 68. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 21. 
 92. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 14. 
 93. See Wang, supra note 62. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See NDRC, supra note 33, § 13. 
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implementing this regulation. Without the additional measure, overseas 
acquisitions still must through approval/recordation scrutiny before closing 
a deal. To streamline the process and ease this unnecessary burden, Reg. No. 
11 eliminates the entire road-pass regime.96 
Reg. No. 11 also adds more procedural transparency by clarifying the 
definition of “investment value.” Even though the new regime abolishes 
most of the investment size granularity, the amount of $300 billion remains 
as a watershed. For example, for FDIs, if the amount exceeds $300 billion, 
the investor has to file recordation with the NDRC in Beijing.97 FDIs below 
$300 billion, in contrast, only need to record with local NDRC.98 For FPIs, 
investments lower than $300 billion are not subject to regulation; only if the 
FPI is more than $300 billion will it be required to file a notice with the 
NDRC.99 Thus, different calculation methods might lead to varying results 
in the appraisal of investment sizes, thus, affecting the cost of compliance. 
Reg. No. 11 defines investment value as the sum of currency, securities, 
assets, technology, intellectual property, equity, debt, financing, and security 
guarantees a Chinese enterprise provides, either directly or indirectly, 
through the operation of off-shore subsidiaries.100 This precise definition of 
investment value substantially unifies the different appraisal measurements 
and makes compliance costs more predictable. 
Other streamlining reforms also add transparency to the process and 
enhance the competitiveness of Chinese investors in permissible outbound 
investments. Reg. No. 11 further elaborates on NDRC procedures for 
sending notice for receipt of petition and notice of amendments.101 These 
improvements help procedural transparency and filing predictability. 
Another streamlining advancement is extension of the term of validity of 
NDRC approval/recordation. Under Reg. No. 9, except for construction 
projects, an approval/recordation of an outbound investment lasted for one 
year. Reg. No. 11 extends this term to 2 years.102 Consequently, Chinese 
enterprises now enjoy a longer time to negotiate their overseas deals. 
 
Policy Algorithm/Deduction 
 
For a Chinese enterprise to invest in a foreign business entity, before it 
goes to MOFCOM and SAFE—no matter for FDI or FPI, if the intended 
 
 96. See supra note 20. 
 97. NDRC, supra note 20, § 14. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at § 14. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See NDRC, supra note 20, §§ 23-25. 
 102. NDRC, supra note 20, § 14. 
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investment is in the sensitive industries of weaponry, cross-border water 
resources development and utilization, news media, real estate, hotels, 
entertainment, sports and equity investment funds or platforms,103—it has to 
file the plan with the NDRC for approval. If an enterprise wants to invest in 
non-sensitive industries, but the destination country is among the countries 
without established diplomatic relations, sanctioned countries, or investment 
projects in countries/regions where war or upheaval occurs, the investor must 
also file with the NDRC for approval.104 It usually takes 20 to 106 days for 
the NDRC to confirm an approval.105 Because this investment is labelled as 
sensitive by the NDRC, the latter procedure will also be time consuming.106 
For any SOEs, sensitive or insensitive, the investment project only needs to 
record with the NDRC. 
For an intended outbound non-sensitive FDI investment, it has to be 
recorded with the NDRC.107 When the intended investment amount is higher 
than $300 billion, the investor has to get the NDRC’s proof of recordation 
before closing the deal.108 If the intended investment is lower than the $300 
billion ceiling, such an investment must be recorded by the local NDRC.109 
The recordation process usually takes seven business days.110 
If the investment is an FPI, the regulatory cost is slightly lighter. Still, 
when the investment exceeds $300 billion, there is a requirement: the 
investor has to file a notice with the NDRC.111 Such a procedure will take 
five business days.112 It is clear that non-sensitive investments, especially 
those below $300 billion, when compared to sensitive investments, receive 
great convenience under Reg. No. 11. 
 
Summary 
 
Across the board, Reg. No. 11 tightens authorities’ capital control 
through broader discretion both in scope and in actual review. By including 
Chinese offshore entities and FPI into its regulatory objects, the NDRC 
directly addresses existing arbitrage practices and hopefully slows down the 
draining of SAFE’s foreign exchange reserves. Through its savvy design for 
the definition of “sensitivity,” the NDRC retains great flexibility that allows 
 
 103. See KPMG AUSTRALIA, supra note 87. 
 104. NDRC, supra note 20, § 7. 
 105. Picardo, supra note 72. 
 106. NDRC, supra note 20, § 2. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at § 14. 
 109. Id. 
 110. NDRC, supra note 68. 
 111. NDRC, supra note 20, § 14. 
 112. NDRC, supra note 68. 
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it to instantly add or remove certain industries to or from the list, subject to 
the highest scrutiny. Reg. No. 11 also extends the NDRC’s power of 
exercising penalties and enforcement beyond the scope of the road-pass. 
Meanwhile, Reg. No. 11 consists of some decentralizing characters that 
do not serve its streamlining purposes. The elimination of the approval 
requirement for large-size investments substantially reduces the NDRC’s 
scrutiny over such investments. Incorporation of the preference list produced 
by the General Office of the State Council indicates the NDRC’s 
commitment to loosen control over outbound investments in the listed 
industries. The introduction of a notice system provides a prototype for 
further decentralization of the NDRC’s regulatory power. 
Some investor-friendly streamlining improvements, such as 
competitiveness, must be highlighted for their positive impacts on domestic 
entities or Chinese offshore entities regarding negotiating, structuring, and 
timing of an outbound deal. The removal of the road-pass regime will boost 
Chinese bidders’ competitiveness in international acquisition deals. The 
extension of validity terms will reduce the passivity of Chinese investors 
when the negotiation process is prolonged. A clear definition of investment 
amount unifies diverged accounting methods, thus, clarifying the investment 
appraisal grey area. 
All of the relaxed regulations are counterintuitive. As discussed earlier, 
Reg. No. 11 is an updated version of Reg. No. 9 in the context of China’s 
rapid drop in its foreign exchange reserve. Because the foreign exchange 
reserve is the primary tool for China’s government to stabilize the Renminbi 
exchange rate, an urgent priority is stringent capital control through 
outbound investment policy. Therefore, the substantial delegation of power 
in Reg. No. 11 counters the urgency to tighten capital control by implying 
that the NDRC is more involved in carrying out some policy goals. 
The inconsistency in Reg. No. 11’s policy goal is to serve the strategic 
plan of “Made in China 2025.” Looking back at the evolution of the NDRC’s 
outbound investment regulations, the consistent logic of preferential 
treatment is the key to decipher these counterintuitive emancipatory designs 
in Reg. No. 11. The beneficiaries of Reg. No. 11 are quite ascertainable: 
large-size, non-sensitive investments in areas encouraged by the State 
Council that will receive the maximum regulatory dividend. By facilitating 
investments in these targeted industries, the NDRC will reshape the ecology 
of Chinese outbound investments by boosting harvests in technologies from 
overseas research and development projects. 
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POLICY GOAL OF REG. NO. 11. 
 
As discussed above, Reg. No. 11 is a set of stringent capital control 
policies with some counterintuitive exceptions. Significantly, non-sensitive 
investments over $2 billion no longer have to undergo prolonged scrutiny 
required by the approval procedure; brownfield investments in high-tech 
enterprises and greenfield investments in overseas research and development 
centers (“R&D centers”) will implicitly enjoy the most favorable 
treatment.113 Given the fact that capital control is an urgent need for China’s 
economic stability, the upstream emancipation illustrates China’s strong 
commitment to accelerating the outbound development of those listed 
industries. It is not a coincidence that the industries mentioned above are also 
the targeted industries in carrying out China’s strategic plan “Made in China 
2025.” 
 
MADE IN CHINA 2025 
 
Issued in 2015, China’s strategic plan “Made in China 2025” became 
an initiative to comprehensively upgrade Chinese industry.114 This ten-year 
national guideline came out in light of China’s imminent need to restructure  
its domestic economy.115 China, as a world factory, is now suffering from a 
series of challenges, such as rising labor costs, low added value, and razor-
thin margins.116 Currently, China’s domestic manufacturing heavily relies 
upon high-end technologies developed by foreign countries. According to 
2017 data, foreign content comprised more than 50% of the high-tech 
products and goods.117 In some categories, such as high-level digital control 
systems and high-level hydraulic components, China is almost entirely 
dependent on foreign production.118 
To survive the pressure from both developed economies, with more 
efficient means of production, and emerging economies, with cheaper labor 
costs, the plan focuses on escalating the value-added chain in production and 
innovation networks. This plan identifies the goal of raising domestic content 
 
 113. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 3. 
 114. Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATIGIC & INT’L. STUD. (June 2015), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025. 
 115. See “Made in China 2025” plan unveiled to boost manufacturing, GB TIMES BEIJING (May 20, 
2015), https://gbtimes.com/made-china-2025-plan-unveiled-boost-manufacturing. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Sara Hsu, Foreign Firms Wary of ‘Made in China 2025,’ But It May Be China’s Best Chance at 
Innovation, FORBES (March 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2017/03/10/foreign-firms-
wary-of-made-in-china-2025-but-it-may-be-chinas-best-chance-at-innovation/#3c9737ac24d2. 
 118. See id. 
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of core components and material to 40% by 2020, and 70% by 2025.119 
Specifically, it urges for the creation of R&D centers with the goal of 
building 15 R&D centers by 2020, and 40 by 2025.120 
Compared to the previous national strategic plan in boosting high 
technology,121 “Made in China 2025” no longer focuses on domestic 
technology innovation. Besides, “Made in China 2025” shifts from state 
funding to a market mechanism with supporting investment policies. In 
2006, the predecessor leadership, the Hu-Wen administration, issued a 15-
year plan.122 The 2006 project aimed to promote “indigenous innovation” 
through funding for domestic R&D centers in Strategic Emerging Industries 
(SEIs).123 However, in the text of “Made in China 2025,” the term 
“indigenous innovation” appears only twice.124 The drafters of the 2015 plan 
are conscious about the omission of such a term of art, because “indigenous 
innovation” was a keyword in the 2004 plan.125 Additionally, unlike the 
previous plan, which committed large state funding to the development of 
SEIs, “Made in China 2025” delegates the duty to market mechanisms, such 
as financing for Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”), to accelerate 
technology developments.126 Consequently, “Made in China 2025” abolishes 
the traditional top-down, state-supported industrial development. Instead, 
the latest plan incentivizes the private sectors to play a leading role in 
technology innovation. Specifically, and relevant to this Note topic, the 2015 
plan calls for the building of multinationals and achieving a bump-up of 
“core competitiveness” through the development of these outbound 
investments.127 
 
NDRC REG. NO. 11’S MOTIVATION MECHANISM 
 
Although Reg. No. 11 is designed to tighten China’s capital control in 
order to address the skyrocketing draining of SAFE’s foreign exchange 
reserve, this regulation has certain counterintuitive features that contradict 
the general goal of capital constraint. Through this Note’s closer look at Reg. 
 
 119. The State Council of PRC, Notice of the State Council on Issuing the “Made in China” (in 
Chinese language) (May 8, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See The State Council of PRC, Outline of the National Program for Long- and Medium-Term 
Scientific and Technological Development (in Chinese language) (Feb. 2006), http://www.gov.cn/jr 
zg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm. 
 122. Id. 
 123. The State Council of PRC, supra note 119. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Hsu, supra note 117. 
4 - XU_KC_10.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  11:13 AM 
114 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
No. 11, the reduction of the NDRC’s scrutiny in large-size investments, and 
the relaxed control over the outbound investments in the listed industries, all 
serve the benefit of the targeted industries of “Made in China 2025.” 
Notably, the language of “increasing investment in and cooperation with 
overseas high-tech enterprise and advanced manufacturing enterprises and 
establishing offshore research and development centers” is the guideline128 
directly addressing the “Made in China” strategy of bumping up Chinese 
enterprises’ “core competitiveness” through the development of these 
outbound investments.129 
Therefore, it is highly likely that Reg. No. 11’s upstream, relaxed 
control over outbound investments in advanced technology and 
manufacturing is a substantive implementation of the policy goal of “Made 
in China 2025.” Incorporating the General Office’s guideline into Reg. No. 
11, the NDRC effectively endorses the State Council’s sorting system by 
identifying “what’s hot”130 and “what’s bad.”131 The NDRC then designs 
substantive mechanisms to incentivize “what’s hot” and disincentivizing 
“what’s bad” by imbedding the design into Reg. No. 11. On one hand, the 
NDRC downgrades its approval scrutiny on “what’s hot” to a more 
streamlined recordation system. Then, the NDRC commits a favorable 
treatment to these investment projects by exercising its recordation power. 
That procedure, as indicated by Reg. No. 11, usually only takes seven 
business days.132 
For “what’s bad,” on the other hand, the NDRC puts all investment 
projects under its scrutinized approval system.133 In case some industries are 
accidentally left off the list, the NDRC provides a catch-all provision to the 
enumerated definition of “sensitive industries.”134 Compared to the fortunate 
non-sensitive industries,  sensitive industries must undergo a thorough 
examination that, in some cases, will take the NDRC more than 106 days to 
complete.135 This substantial preferential treatment (together with a 
collaboration with the MOFCOM, PBOC, SAFE, and potentially SASAC 
and CSRC), is anticipated to achieve the goal of “Made in China 2025” by 
bumping up Chinese enterprises’ “core competitiveness” through the 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Here, this term refers to investments in overseas high-tech enterprises, advanced manufacturing 
enterprises and R&D centers. 
 131. Additionally in the context of economic development. Here the term particularly refers to 
sensitive industries such as real estate, hotels, entertainment, sports and equity investment funds or 
platforms. 
 132. See NDRC, supra note 20, § 22. 
 133. Id. § 25. 
 134. Id. 
 135. NDRC, supra note 121. 
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development of outbound investments in venture capital funding and 
acquisition of high-tech enterprises and R&D centers.136 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF REG. NO. 11. 
 
Even though well-intended and ingeniously designed, Reg. No. 11 will 
have a limited effect on promoting the goal of boosting the number of 
Chinese outbound high-tech enterprises and R&D centers. Two major 
factors affect these challenges. First, even though Reg. No. 11 responds to 
some of the existing arbitrage practices, loopholes in ex-ante and ex-post 
supervision will still drain the foreign exchange reserve. Second, 
externalities, such as destination countries’ counter policies, will create a 
high compliance burden that dwarfs Reg. No. 11’s motivating mechanisms. 
 
REG. NO. 11’S RESPONSE TO EXISTING ARBITRAGE 
 
There were two significant practices before Reg. No. 11 that 
circumvented the NDRC’s regulations regarding outbound investments, FPI, 
and structured finance through offshore Special Purpose Entities (“offshore 
SPEs”). Another practice that substantially frustrated the capital control 
purpose was an abuse of the system: de facto asset smuggling in the name of 
investment. 
For a long time, the NDRC only regulated FDIs. All predecessors of 
Reg. No. 11 remained silent about FPI, i.e., the more speculative way of 
investing. As a grey area that might be free from the NDRC’s supervision, 
FPI activities, such as offshore financial operations in China Hong Kong,137 
European banks, and the British Virgin Islands, were a quick and easy way 
to launder money.138 This regulation defect mainly frustrated the NDRC’s 
capital control purposes and substantially drained the SAFE exchange 
reserve. In addition to the hazards of money laundering and given the natrure 
of the capital market, portfolio investments are generally more risky and 
fragile than FDIs.139 Reg. No. 11 directly addresses these issues by including 
FPI into its regulatory scope.140 Mainly, investments in equity funds or 
platforms are listed as “sensitive investment[s]” and are, therefore, subject 
 
 136. Hsu, supra note 117. 
 137. Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China; thus, it enjoys a semi-independent 
jurisdiction. 
 138. See Diane Francis, Why $10B of China’s money is laundered every month,  (July 26, 2014, 5:00 
PM), https://nypost.com/2014/07/26/why-10b-of-chinas-money-is-laundered-every-month/. 
 139. See Wang, supra note 59. 
 140. See id. 
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to the highest scrutiny by the NDRC.141 All of these significant moves 
demonstrate the NDRC’s determination to regulate the FPI market, which 
might lead to an effective outcome. 
Structured financing through offshore SPEs was also a popular method 
to bypass the NDRC’s regulation.142 Before Reg. No. 11, the NDRC only 
regulated outbound investments conducted by domestically incorporated 
Chinese enterprises.143 As a result, some domestic enterprises exploited the 
use of offshore entities to avoid the NDRC.144 Through this practice, 
domestic enterprises only needed to file with the NDRC once before setting 
up offshore SPEs.145 Once the SPEs were set up, domestic enterprises were 
able to send remittance in the name of internal financial operation, thus, 
circumventing the NDRC regulation.146 After funding arrived to offshore 
entities, domestic enterprises were able to make outbound investments by 
directly instructing their outbound subsidiaries to do so.147 In response to this 
arbitrage, Reg. No. 11 expands its regulatory scope to overseas entities 
controlled by domestic enterprises.148 The regulatory scope of Reg. No. 11 
also includes de facto enterprise investments by individual investors through 
offshore SPEs.149 However, the supervision mechanism for offshore SPE 
investments is somewhat relaxed: for investment less than $300 billion, Reg. 
No. 11 does not have any requirements; for investment more than the $300 
billion ceiling, Reg. No. 11 only requires notice.150 It remains to be seen 
whether such an easygoing regulation will serve as a deterrence to 
speculative arbitrage. 
Even though Reg. No. 11 has made great strides to eliminate loopholes 
of predecessors’ drafting defects, it leaves out general outbound investments: 
outbound investments are to be conducted by domestic individual investors. 
Reg. No. 11 restricts its regulation only to domestic enterprises and offshore 
SPEs controlled by domestic enterprises and individuals. Such an exclusion 
of individual investor outbound investment is likely caused by drafting 
errors, since the drafters of Reg. No. 11 are aware of this generical 
investment and addresses part of it (i.e., individual investor outbound 
investments through control over offshore BVI) in the code. Whether this 
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 144. See Wang, supra note 62. 
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exclusion of individual investors’ direct outbound investment will become a 
widespread arbitrage practice is uncertain at this point, since Reg. No. 11 has 
only been implemented for eight months.151 
Being the planner of China’s macroeconomy, the NDRC employs its 
policy goals through various sets of regulations. As explained above, the 
NDRC has been shaping and reshaping the landscape of the private 
sectors’ outbound investments throughout the evolution of its outbound 
investment policies. This current version’s policy goal is to constrain 
capital outflow while channeling all the possible outflows to areas 
targeted by “Made in China 2025.” However, the current version, like all 
of its predecessors, is bound by its limited ability to regulate the early 
stages of investments. In other words, Reg. No. 11’s biggest weakness is 
its lack of follow-up supervision and enforcement mechanisms. 
Notwithstanding the newly added ex-post supervision mechanism, Reg. 
No. 11’s enforcement power is still weak when it comes to certain 
abusing practices. Even though the new regime now shares information 
with all other administrative agencies, including criminal prosecutors, it 
only requires an investor to notify the NDRC about subsequent progress 
after the NDRC confirms the transaction.152 The sheer requirement of 
information disclosure will leave outbound investors the wiggle room to 
maneuver what and how much to disclose, leaving the NDRC and 
relevant administrative agencies high and dry. 
 
EXTERNALITIES 
 
Externalities, such as counter policies issued by destination countries, 
will also negatively impact the effectiveness of Reg. No. 11 in carrying out 
“Made in China 2025” goals. Even though the General Office guidelines 
specifically focus on investments in countries that make up “the Belt and 
Road” initiative, outbound investments that can yield substantial 
technological breakthroughs will mostly occur in the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries (“OECD”),153 especially 
the U.S., Europe, and East Asia. As the world’s leading technology 
developer, however, the U.S. adopts a hostile attitude towards “Made in 
China 2025.”154 
On June 18, 2018, the U.S. Senate passed the FIRRMA bill, that aimed 
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to enhance the power of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (“CFIUS”). This bill directly addresses concerns about high-levels of 
foreign investments in U.S. technology through an extension of its regulatory 
power. Now the CFIUS has policing control over any non-passive foreign 
investments by a foreign person in an unaffiliated U.S. critical technology or 
infrastructure company.155 It is not a coincidence that this extension overlaps 
investments most favored by China’s NDRC. 
By widely extending the CFIUS’ regulatory discretionary power, 
FIRRMA appears to be an obstacle to “Made in China 2025.” One of the key 
features of this new bill is that it prolongs the initial review period (from 30 
days to 120 days) of CFIUS for investments under its jurisdiction.156 For 
those benefitted by Reg. No. 11’s shortened review mechanism, the lengthy 
review by the CFIUS will lead a net even in the time cost of compliance. 
Most likely to frustrate China’s purposes, FIRRMA requires Chinese 
investments to submit biennial reports, including how it comports with the 
objectives of the “Made in China 2025” plan, how it compares to U.S. 
investments in China, and any data collection difficulties.157 These high-
pressure supervision mechanisms are likely to impose extraordinary 
compliance burdens and uncertainties on Reg. No. 11’s most favored 
investments, dwarfing Reg. No. 11’s motivational mechanisms, and 
offsetting the NDRC’s efforts of channeling China’s outbound investments. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Through an extensive discussion in this Note, it is clear that Reg. No. 
11 lets the NDRC exercise tightened control over China’s capital outflows 
to slow down the draining of SAFE’s foreign exchange reserve. Exempting 
investments in outbound high-tech enterprises and R&D centers from the 
heightened scrutiny, Reg. No. 11 incentivizes such developments to achieve 
the policy goals behind “Made in China 2025.” Besides, this policy update 
contains many ingenious designs that reduce unnecessary compliance 
burdens and fix Reg. No. 9’s loopholes. The effectiveness of Reg. No. 11 is 
unclear as it faces great challenges from some possible arbitrage activities 
and counterintuitive policies from destination countries. 
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